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The World Economy 
The present recovery in the world economy 
has now proceeded for almost twice as long 
as the typical cyclical phase of expansion 
during the past four decades. Growth in 
1985 and prospective growth for 1986 i s , 
however, modest in comparison to both the 
ra tes achieved in e a r l i e r upswings and 
that of 1983-4 when world expansion was 
driven by the strong growth of the US 
economy. With the deceleration of the US 
economy from i t s phase of rapid expansion 
and the continuing policy caution in the 
countries of Western Europe and Japan, 
growth in the major i n d u s t r i a l i s e d 
economies i s l ikely to be of the order of 
2.5? in 1986. 
The p re sen t recovery in the major 
economies differs from earlier experience 
in that output growth has been accompanied 
by r i s i n g unemployment . Higher 
unemployment i s not, however, universal. 
While unemployment has fa l len in the US, 
i t has r i s e n in Western Europe. A 
further difference i s t h a t the present 
recovery, even during i t s more expansive 
phase, has not generated widespread 
i f la t ionary pressure. Neither capacity 
constraints nor shortages of raw materials 
have been encountered. In recent years 
there has been considerable softness in 
commodity markets. Moreover, the recent 
downward movement in o i l prices shows 
every sign of becoming more marked. The 
prospect i s , therefore tha t inf la t ion in 
the major OECD countries w i l l be reduced 
further over 1986. 
Developments in the world economy wi l l 
continue to be largely determined in the 
coming months by attempts to resolve the 
three major imbalances that have arisen in 
the course of the current recovery: in 
t rade, savings flows and in ternat ional 
finance. These imbalances focus much 
at tent ion on the US current account and 
budget d e f i c i t s . In p a r t a l s o 
developments will be influenced by events 
in o i l markets. In s tark contrast to the 
substant ia l price increases in 1973 and 
1979, o i l p r i c e s have been f a l l i n g 
s h a r p l y . OPEC now a c c e p t s t h e 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y of lower pr ices , given 
present market conditions. These lower 
prices will contribute to growth and lower 
inf la t ion in most countries and to some 
l e s sen ing of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l debt 
problems of oil-importing countries. 
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As in earl ier quarters of 1985, aggregate 
indus t r ia l growth in the OECD countries 
continued to be depressed in the th i rd 
quarter by re la t ive ly slow US output 
growth. In addition, the US growth r a t e 
continued for the third successive quarter 
to fal l some distance short of other major 
OECD countr ies . While US output grew a t 
an annualised ra te of 1.8$, Japan, West 
Germany and the UK enjoyed annualised 
growth r a t e s of 3.8$, 3.4$ and 5.6$ 
respectively. Only France with a negative 
growth r a t e of -0.3$ experienced l e s s 
rapid expansion than the US. Total OECD 
growth recorded an annualised ra te of 
2.0$. 
As for earlier quarters, tine US Department 
of Commerce revised downwards i t s in i t i a l 
" f lash" growth e s t i m a t e of 3.2$ to a 
preliminary estimate of 2.4$ for the 
fourth quarter of 1985. Growth for 1985 
as a whole i s , therefore, now estimated at 
2.3$, a r a t e considerably below that of 
6.6$ recorded during 1984 and the 
Administration's or iginal forecast for 
1985 of 4$. While t he r e i s l i t t l e 
prospect of returning to the rapid growth 
of 1984, a number of factors suggest that 
US growth i s likely to be stronger during 
1986 than in 1985. Against a background 
of spare capacity and low stock r a t i o s , 
the decline in interest rates during 1985 
and lower o i l p r i c e s are l i k e l y to 
s t i m u l a t e househo ld and b u s i n e s s 
expenditure. Recent US experience, as 
discussed in previous Commentaries, has 
been that increased demand has generated a 
lesser expansion of output since much of 
the increased demand has been sa t i s f ied 
through imports. Over the past year, 
however, the US dol lar has depreciated 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y a g a i n s t o t h e r major 
currencies. During 1985 the US dol lar 
f e l l in value by almost 15$ against the 
yen and by over 10$ against the Deutsche 
Mark. Thus, a higher proportion of the 
increased demand i s likely to be reflected 
in output growth and some improvement in 
the current account balance. 
The major problem facing the US Government 
i s the budget de f i c i t . Under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollins plan, mandatory reductions 
in the budget def ic i t w i l l cause some 
depression of aggregate demand. The 
r educ t ions requi red during 1986 are, 
however, relatively limited and will only 
partially offset the effects of expansion 
in the other components of demand. 
For other major countries the combination 
of a weaker dol lar and some reduction in 
the budget deficit i s likely to reinforce 
the recent waning of the stimulus to world 
trade. The implications of any trade 
slow-down are most serious for Japan, the 
p r i n c i p a l benef i c i a ry of the US-led 
expansion over 1983/85. Despi te the 
appreciation of the yen, Japan achieved a 
record trade surplus of US$46bn in 1985 of 
which US$39.5bn was a surplus on trade 
with the US. There is a consensus view in 
Japan that growth will be more modest than 
in recent years and that exports are 
l ikely to account for l i t t l e , if any, of 
that growth. Despite the resulting need, 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e , for 
expansionary policy measures, the Japanese 
authorities remain wedded to the need for 
monetary and fiscal restraint. To a great 
extent the room for Japanese manoeuvre on 
domestic pol icy i s cons t ra ined by 
considerations surrounding her substantial 
current account surplus. 
Japan i s already committed to attempting 
to reduce that surplus by increasing 
imports through the "import ac t ion 
programme" announced l a s t year . The 
effects of tha t programme on the current 
account surplus might well be unwound, 
however, were f i s c a l r e l a x a t i o n to 
p r e c i p i t a t e a f a l l in the yen. The 
r e s u l t i n g cu r t a i lmen t of imports and 
stimulus to exports would most probably 
e x a c e r b a t e d i s c o n t e n t e l s e w h e r e , 
par t icu la r ly in the United States where 
pro tec t ionis t sentiment i s aready high. 
There has been some swi tching to 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l spending wi th in the 
framework of a largely unchanged f i sca l 
stance to help promote employment (see 
l a s t Commentary). Apart from the s l igh t 
cut in discount ra te in January 1985, 
there i s unlikely to be any dramatic shift 
in Japanese monetary and fiscal policies 
with the possibility of some tax cuts in a 
pre-election period being the most likely, 
although probably limited, fiscal boost to 
domestic demand. The principal sources of 
demand growth wi l l be consumer spending 
and the Government's public works and 
housing programme. 
West Germany also enjoyed a substant ia l 
v is ib le trade balance in 1985 of over 
£20bn as a consequence of a more than 7% 
increase in real exports and, as in Japan, 
the contribution of the external sector to 
growth is expected to largely disappear in 
1986 while, with r is ing real disposable 
income boosted by income tax c u t s , 
consumer spending wi l l provide the main 
source of growth. In addition to the tax 
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c u t s , f i s c a l pol icy w i l l exe r t some 
expansionary impact through an expected 7? 
increase in public sector investment. 
In France the export sector i s l ike ly to 
continue making a negative contribution to 
growth as a consequence of the continuing 
l o s s of compe t i t i veness by French 
e x p o r t e r s . I n c r e a s e s in c a p i t a l 
e x p e n d i t u r e and some r e c o v e r y in 
investment expenditure, although both 
s t i l l weak, are l ike ly to be the main 
factors generating growth during 1986. 
Having fai led to contain the 1985 budget 
def ic i t of 3.25% of GDP within the target 
of 3? of GDP, a t t e m p t s to achieve 
budgetary r e s t r a i n t remain a principal 
policy objective. Lit t le shift in policy 
is likely before the spring elections and 
over 1986 French growth i s expected to 
rise towards 1.5? as compared to the rate 
of around 1.0? achieved in 1985. 
With l i t t l e s ign of any s i g n i f i c a n t 
relaxation of policy among other major 
OECD countr ies , such as Japan and West 
Germany, to take up the slack in the world 
economy, OECD growth in 1986 i s forecast 
to f a l l to around 2.5? from the estimate 
of almost 3.0? for 1985. 
LABOUR MARKETS 









/\ ' . 
' / / \-
f I / \ / \ 
—J/ N—\ 
1 
. . . EJRORE 
- - US 
85 3 
After fa l l ing s l igh t ly in the second 
qua r t e r of 1985, OECD unemployment 
remained unchanged at a standardised rate 
of 8.1? in the t h i r d q u a r t e r . This 
overall ra te i s the outcome of a wide 
diversity of experience in OECD countries. 
Despite the deceleration of growth between 
1984 and 1985, unemployment in the US 
during 1985 fell below that for 1984. The 
average unemployment rate of 7.2? for 1985 
was the lowest recorded for five years. 
Third quarter f a l l s in unemployment in 
Canada and the US were offset by higher 
unemployment elsewhere. Unemployment rose 
in Japan, remained unchanged in France and 
fel l in West Germany and the UK. Despite 
the r i s e in Japanese unemployment, the 
J a p a n e s e r a t e of 2 .6? r e m a i n s 
substantially below those for the European 
countries. Unemployment rates in the EEC 
and OECD Europe were 10.8? and 11.0? 
respectively. 
The reduction in unemployment in the US 
during 1985 was accounted for by increases 
in employment in finance, insurance and 
other services. Job gains in these areas 
more than o f f s e t j ob l o s s e s in 
manufacturing, particularly in texti les, 
electronics, metals and chemicals, which 
resulted from the earlier strength of the 
US d o l l a r . Around 70? of the net 
employment increase represented jobs for 
women. Given the l ike ly pattern of the 
determinants of growth during 1986 in 
European economies, t h i s pattern of a 
shift in the balance of employment towards 
dependence on s e r v i c e s i s s e t to be 
increasingly evident in Europe. I t i s 
unlikely, however, that European economies 
will achieve fal ls in unemployment similar 
to those in the US. The cont inuing 
pursui t of t i gh t f i sca l and monetary 
pol ic ies suggests that unemployment i s 
l ike ly to continue at current l eve ls . 
Labour market policies in Europe continue 
to be directed primarily a t reducing or 
eliminating labour market r igidi t ies (see 
November 1985 Commentary). 
INFLATION 
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Despite the durability of the present 
recovery in the world economy, there 
remains, as discussed in previous 
Commentaries, an absence of any marked 
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i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s . With t h e 
continuing softness in oil and commodity 
markets and reductions in import prices of 
i tems denominated in US d o l l a r s for 
countries other than the US following the 
dollar's depreciation, the annualised rate 
of inf la t ion for the OECD f e l l to 4.3% in 
the third quarter of 1985 from a ra te of 
4.7% in the previous quarter. 
As in e a r l i e r quar ters , the average for 
the OECD area embraces cons ide rab le 
d i f f e r ences in i n f l a t i o n r a t e s both 
between North America and European 
countries and among European countries . 
Although the annualised ra te for North 
America rose from 2.1% to 3.3% between the 
second and third quarters, the l a t t e r rate 
remains well below the third quarter 
averages for OECD Europe and the EEC of 
6.1% and 4.9%. Within Europe inf la t ion 
ra tes f e l l from 2.3% to 1.8% for West 
Germany, from 6.1% to 4.9% for France and 
from 6.9% to 5.4% for the UK. Of these 
three major European countries only West 
Germany achieved a lower annual rate than 
the 3.2% recorded for the US. Moreover, 
the European average i s boosted by 
continuing high inf la t ion ra tes in a 
number of smaller countries. Portugal, 
Greece, Iceland and Turkey, for example, 
recorded th i rd quarter ra tes of 15.9%, 
20.1%, 31.1% and 42.4% respectively. With 
the yen's appreciation reinforcing the 
effects on import costs of weak o i l and 
commodity prices, Japan's inf la t ion ra te 
f e l l to 1.8% from 2.4% in the second 
quarter and remains lower than in any 
other OECD country. 
The rise in the US inflation rate reflects 
a number of factors. Dollar appreciation 
has r a i s ed non-o i l commodity pr ices . 
Prices of imported manufactures are also 
r i s ing . While, l ike other exporters to 
the US, Japanese companies could absorb 
the effects of dol lar depreciation in 
lower prof i t margins, they have raised 
prices to quell American discontent that 
voluntary r e s t r a i n t s on sales to the US 
are being ignored and to try to avert the 
poss ib i l i ty that import quotas may be 
introduced. A further influence i s the 
upward effect tightening labour market 
conditions, in conjunction with slowing 
productivity, i s exerting on unit labour 
costs . In the coming months the most 
important of these influences on inflation 
is likely to be depreciation of the dollar 
and inf la t ion i s forecast to r i se to 4.5% 
t h i s year, thus reversing the beneficial 
effect over the past three years on US 
inflation of a strong dollar (see previous 
Commentaries). 
In Europe governments remain committed to 
i n f l a t i o n con t ro l through forms of 
monetary control . As e l e c t i o n s come 
nearer in a number of European countries, 
commentators increasingly focus attention 
on signs of an e lectora l ly a t t r ac t ive 
easing of f iscal policy, par t icular ly in 
the UK and West Germany. Overa l l , 
however, the p i c t u r e i s one of a 
continuing cautious approach to policy. 
Weak commodity pr ices , the strength of 
European currencies against the dollar 
and, with the notable exception of the UK, 
moderate growth of unit labour costs are 
contributing to the control of inflation. 
Con t inu ing modera t ion of European 
inf la t ion and some r i s e in the US ra te 
wi l l contribute to further narrowing of 
differentials this year. 
PROGNOSIS 
Explicit recognition of the end of the 
period of benign neglect towards the US 
dollar came at the September 1985 meeting 
of the Group of Five. In the following 
months the dollar has depreciated against 
most other major currencies and the US 
current account deficit looks set to peak 
in mid-1986 and to moderate thereafter . 
The d o l l a r ' s dep rec i a t i on has been 
a t t r ibu tab le only in very small part to 
exchange market intervention by the US 
au thor i t i es which has been l imited in 
scope. Rather the reason l i e s primarily 
in the maintenance of in t e res t ra tes at 
around the same levels as prevailed l a te 
las t summer. 
The combination of a depreciating dollar 
and no upward adjustment of interest rates 
provides a s t imulus to US economic 
activity. The strength and durability of 
that stimulus i s c r i t i c a l l y dependent, 
however, on developments in the US budget 
deficit following the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins 
Act. Unless reductions of the scale 
envisaged by Gramm-Rudman-Hollins are made 
in the US budget de f i c i t , the danger 
remains of a "crash-landing" for the 
dol lar with i t s associated adjustment 
problems including the need for higher 
interest rates. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollins 
Act provides a t i m e t a b l e for phased 
reductions in the de f ic i t designed to 
achieve balance by 1991. Certain 
sensi t ive expenditures such as Medicaid 
and some forms of aid to families are 
completely exempt while others such as 
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Medicare are subject to l imited cuts , 
should r educ t ions be necessary . If 
Congress f a i l s to achieve the budget 
reductions, the mandatory reductions, or 
Presidential "sequestering", must be spl i t 
evenly between defence and non-defence 
expenditure. 
Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollins the de f i c i t 
t a r g e t for 1986 i s e s t a b l i s h e d a t 
US$171.9bn. Government agencies forecast, 
however, a deficit of US$278bn. With this 
year's mandatory reductions l imited to 
only US$11.7bn the 1986 ta rge t de ic i t 
cannot, therefore, be attained. Much more 
substant ia l reductions are required in 
fol lowing years and t h i s has led to 
arguments that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollins 
P r o v i s i o n s a r e u n w o r k a b l e . The 
President's budget proposals for the next 
fiscal year have now been published. As 
announced, these proposals seem to conform 
to the requirements of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollins. Much debate will take place in 
Congress, however, on the de t a i l s of the 
proposals and changes may be made, as i s 
usual, before October. 
Amid the uncertainty and scepticism there 
is a major posi t ive impact. The new Act 
requires Congress to subject the budget 
and the implications of a continuing 
unchecked de f i c i t to harsh scrutiny. As 
argued in previous Commentaries, failure 
to tackle the US budget de f i c i t w i l l 
seriously constrain resolution of problems 
in the US and the associated imbalances in 
the world economy. 
More immediately, and more encouragingly 
for global growth this year, there i s the 
prospect of continuing reductions in o i l 
prices. Pressures on the OPEC cartel have 
become increasingly apparent during the 
1980's. The cartel 's ability to determine 
prices in the 1970's arose d i rec t ly from 
the low short-run price e l a s t i c i t y of 
demand for oi l and OPEC's high share of 
non-Communist markets. Diminution of the 
c a r t e l ' s power r e f l e c t s considerable 
s h i f t s in both of these e lements . 
Conservation and the development of 
subs t i tu tes have generated a declining 
market for o i l and non-OPEC sources have 
increased their market shares. 
The in i t i a l signs of internal weakening of 
the ca r t e l were seen in the cheating on 
quotas and prices by a number of members. 
Increasing weakness also led OPEC to 
suggest, unsuccessfully, to non-members 
such as the UK and Norway over the past 
two yea r s t h a t they should r e s t r i c t 
supplies to help forestall downward price 
movements. At the Geneva meeting of OPEC 
in December 1985 Saudi Arabia, the most 
powerful actor in the markets, resigned 
i t s role as "pendulum" supplier. Saudi 
Arabia i s , therefore, no longer prepared 
to accept the residual quotas required to 
meet OPEC's overall target output. This 
move i s d i r e c t e d a t two proximate 
o b j e c t i v e s : achievement of g r e a t e r 
adherence to quotas on the part of other 
OPEC members and in f l i c t ion of lower 
pr ices on non-OPEC suppliers for the i r 
f a i lu re to conform more closely to the 
general thrust of OPEC's s trategy. More 
fundamentally, however, the Saudi action 
re f l ec t s the i r underlying view tha t the 
experience of conservation and economies 
over the past decade indicates the need 
for a period of lower market pr ices to 
revive a medium- to longer-term market for 
o i l . 
The prospect of further f a l l s in o i l 
pr ices presents the poss ib i l i ty of the 
r e v e r s a l of the painful adjustment 
problems encountered by the world economy 
in the 1970's. Clearly the impact of 
lower o i l pr ices wi l l not be universally 
advantageous. Both OPEC and non-OPEC oil 
producers will experience deterioration in 
the i r terms of trade and reductions in 
foreign exchange earnings. The effects on 
a heavily indebted producer such as Mexico 
will revive the spectre of a cr is is in the 
world financial system which has receded 
since 1983 and which the Baker plan seeks 
to tackle. For most industrial economies, 
however, the p r i c e r educ t ions w i l l 
contribute s ignif icant ly to lower costs 
and the attainment of inf la t ion t a rge t s , 
while oi l- import ing developing countries 
wi l l enjoy lessening of the i r foreign 
exchange and debt problems. 
Lower o i l p r i c e s have come, q u i t e 
for tu i tously , when concern ex is t s over 
where a stimulus to world growth wi l l 
emerge to compensate for slowing US growth 
and the reluctance of other countries to 
take up the slack in the world economy 
through more act ive ref lat ionary policy 
i n i t i a t i v e s . This beneficial influence 
will be reinforced if the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollins Act leads to effective action on 
the US budget d e f i c i t and, the reby , 
permits reductions in the internat ional 
level of interest rates. 
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